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JUVENILE COURT BINDOVER HEARINGS
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert 'J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
On July 1, 1994 extensive amendments to the Ohio Rules
Jf Juvenile Procedure,became effective. One of the most
mportant rules, as well as one of the most controversial, is
~ule 30 which governs "bindover" proceedings. This procejure, also known as transfer, refers to the process by which
1 juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction and transfers a
jelinquency case to the criminal courts for prosecution. In
)hio juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over persons
mder the age of 18 who are charged with criminal conduct.
~.C. 2151.23(A)(I). However, a juvenile 15-17 years of age
vho has been charged with a felony may be "boundover" to
he criminal court for trial as an adult.
Bindover is unique to juvenile courts. "There is no pro:eeding for adults comparable directly to the juvenile jurisliction waiver hearing." Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F..2d 169,
73 (4th Cir. 1970). It is part "preliminary hearing" and part
sentencing hearing:'
Bindover procedures have been part of the juvenile court
;ystem since the turn of the century, when the first juvenile
:ourts were established in this country. Virtually every state
>as some type of bindover procedure. Nevertheless, the
>rocedure remains controversial. The concept of bindover
mtails an implicit recognition that the juvenile court system
;hould not be available to all children:
Some acts are so offensive to the community that the
arbitrary line drawn at eighteen cannot acceptably be
used to protect the alleged wrongdoer. The serious
offender should not be permitted to escape the criminal
justice system simply because he or she is a day or a
year short of eighteen. As age eighteen approaches,
credible argument can be made that the juvenile court's
always inadequate resources should not be devoted to
those youthful wrongdoers whose offenses are so serious or who appear to be so incorrigible as to be unworthy of or beyond help. IJA-ABA Standards Relating to
Transfer Between Courts 3 (1980).
This view of transfer proceedings is not universally
.ccepted: "Others argue that the existence of this loophole
ransfer] in the juvenile system indicates a half-hearted
ommitment to treatment and a continued allegiance to retibution on the part of society, an allegiance that is particulrly distasteful because it applies to the very persons
thorn the separate juvenile court system was designed to
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protect." P. Piersma, J. Ganousis, A. Volenik, H. Swanger &
P. Connell, Law and Tactics in Juvenile Cases 274 (3d ed.
1977).

CONSTITUTIONAl ISSUES
Procedural Due Process
In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court considered a challenge to transfer
proceedings conducted pursuant to the D.C. Code. Kent
was taken into custody for rape. As a 16 year old, he was
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. The juvenile court,
however, transferred his case for trial as an adult. The
transfer was accomplished without a hearing or written reasons. In addition, the juvenile court failed to provide Kent's
attorney with access to Kent's social service file.
On review, the Supreme Court held that the transfer proceedings were invalid. According to the Court, transfer is a
"critically important" stage of the juvenile process and "there
is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of
such tremendous consequences without ceremony - without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without
a statement of reasons." /d. at 554.
Whether the Court intended to rest its decision in Kent on
statutory or constitutional grounds is not entirely clear. At
one point in the opinion, Justice Fortas wrote: "The
Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States
Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit provide
an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we go no
further." /d. at 556. Nevertheless, other parts of the opinion
indicate a constitutional basis. One passage reads: "We
believe that this result is required by the statute read in the
context of constitutional principles relating to due process
and the assistance of counsel." /d. at 557. In another passage, the Court wrote that a transfer hearing "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."
/d. at 562.
A year after Kent was decided, the Supreme Court in In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), revolutionized juvenile court
procedure by applying due process safeguards to delinquency hearings. The Court ruled: "[N]either the
Fourteenth Amendment [due process] nor the Bill of Rights
is for adults alone." /d. at 13. The Court also quoted the
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Kent passage on due process and then wrote: "We reiterate this view ... as a requirement which is part of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our
Constitution." /d. at 3Q-31.
Most courts now view Kent as establishing constitutional
standards for bindover. For example, the Third Circuit has
stated: "[l]t is our view that Kent, particularly in light of the
Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in In re Gault ... sets
forth certain principles of constitutional dimension." United
States ex rei. Turner v. Rundle, 438 F.2d 839, 841-42 (3d Cir.
1971).
The Ohio courts have repeatedly treated Kent as a constitutional case. See State v. Adams, 69 Ohio St.2d 120, 127
n.4, 431 N.E.2d 326, 331 n.4 (1982); State v. Taylor, 26 Ohio
App.3d 69, 498 N.E.2d 211 (1985); State v. Oviedo, 5 Ohio
App.3d 168, 170, 450 N.E.2d 700, 703 (1982); State v. Riggins,
68 Ohio App.2d I, 6, 426 N.E.2d 504, 508 (1980); In re Mack,
22 Ohio App.2d 201, 203, 260 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1970).

act, (2) the act would be a felony if committed by an adult,
and (3) the child was 15 years or older. The child's age at
the time of the offense, rather than at the time of the transfer hearing, controls.
The age requirement can cause unexpected results. For
example,.in In re C, Alleged Delinquent Child, 61 Ohio
Misc.2d 610, 580 N.E.2d 1182 (C.P. 1991 ), the "delinquent"
was not charged until after he was 21 years of age. The
rape was alleged to have been committed when the "juvenile" was 14 years of age. A motion for bindover was dismissed because he was not 15 years old at the time of the
alleged conduct. /d. at 612. The court also ruled that it
lacked jurisdiction over the child at this time and therefore
could not adjudicate the case. /d. at 614.
DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER
The most common type of transfer is discretionary transfer. In this situation, the court must find that there are reasonable grounds to believe (1) that the child is not
amenable to care or rehabilitation or further care or rehabilitation in any facility for delinquent juveniles, and (2) that the
safety of the community may require legal restraint for a
period extending beyond his majority. R.C. 2151.26(A)(1 );
Juv. R. 30(D).

Bindover Criteria
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has yet to consider the
constitutionality of the standards used in bindover proceedings. Kent involved procedural due process, not the substantive standard used to transfer a juvenile to criminal court. In
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court commented
that it "has never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the
nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court." /d. at 537.
Constitutional challenges to transfer statutes typically
have been based on vagueness grounds, but these challenges generally have failed. E.g., Speck v. Auger, 558 F.2d
394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 999 (1977); Donald L. v.
Superior Court, 498 P.2d 1098, 1104 (Cal. 1972); People v.
Fields, 199 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich.l972), aff'd on rehearing,
216 N.W.2d 51 (Mich.l974).

Juvenile Rule 30: Enumerated Factors
Amended Rule 30(F) requires the court to consider the
following factors in determining whether a child is amenable
to treatment: (1) age, (2) mental-physical condition, (3)
prior juvenile record, (4) prior attempts at rehabilitation, (5)
family environment, (6) school record, and (7) the specific
facts of the offense. These factors have been applied in
numerous Ohio cases:
(1) Age: State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 94, 547
N.E.2d 1181 (1989) ("Because of a juvenile's age, there
may not be sufficient time remaining for rehabilitation to
take place before the twenty-first birthday, even though the
juvenile is otherwise amenable to rehabilitation."); State v.
Ruple, No. 15726 (9th Dist. Ct. App., 8-4-93) at 5 ("sixteen
years and seven months old at the time of the incident").
(2) Mental-physical condition: State v. Watson, 47 Ohio
St.3d 93, 94, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989) ("[N]o evidence of
any psychiatric disorder."); State v. McDonald, No. 11228
(2d Dist. Ct. App., 6-5-90) at 12 ("psychological tests 'suggested' that the appellant was intensely hostile and destructive, and had a 'sadistic potential"').
(3) Prior juvenile record: State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d
93, 94, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989) ("[N]o record of trouble with
juvenile authorities."); State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34,
36, 485 N.E.2d 711, 713 (1985) ("lengthy prior juvenile
record"); State v. Carter, 27 Ohio St.2d 135, 138, 272 N.E.2d
119, 121 (1971)("many court appearances"); State v. Houston,
70 Ohio App.3d 152, 156, 590 N.E.2d 839 (1990) ("previous
juvenile record from Michigan").
(4) Previous efforts to treat or rehabilitate: State v. Carter,
27 Ohio St.2d 135, 138, 272 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1971)(prior commitment to correctional school); State v. Parks, 51 Ohio
App.3d 194, 197, 555 N.E.2d 671 (1988) (prior sentence to
juvenile facility at Riverview Center and prior stay at
Columbus juvenile facility marked by fights and poor attitude); State v. Whiteside, 6 Ohio App.3d 30, 35, 452 N.E.2d
332, 338 (1982)(prior treatment at the Ohio Youth
Commission); State v. Oviedo, 5 Ohio App.3d 168, 171, 450
N.E.2d 700, 704 (1982)(prior probation).

OHIO PROCEDURES
Ohio bindover proceedings are governed by R.C. 2151.26
and Juvenile Rule 30. The 1994 amendments have
reduced the differences between these two provisions.
Even prior to these amendments, however, the Ohio
Supreme Court had indicated that the statute and rule
should be construed together. See State v. Douglas, 20
Ohio St.3d 34, 35, 485 N.E.2d 711 (1985) ("R.C. 2151.26
and Juv. R. 30 set forth the procedure to be followed by a
juvenile court in a bind-over situation.").
Generally, only a properly transferred juvenile may be
prosecuted in the criminal courts. A prosecution in criminal
court on the mistaken belief that the child was over 18 at the
time of the offense is a "nullity." R.C. 2151.26(E). Moreover,
"mailure to comply with the provisions of R.C. 2151.26 ... deprives the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction over a juvenile defendant." State v. Riggins, 68 Ohio App.2d I, 4, 426
N.E.2d 504, 507 (1980). Accord State v. Taylor, 26 Ohio
App.3d 69, 498 N.E.2d 211 (1985) (Failure to comply with notice requirements deprives the criminal court of jurisdiction.)
JUVENilES SUBJECT TO TRANSFER
The statute and Rule 30 specify which juveniles are
subject to bindover and the applicable criteria for making
discretionary bindover decisions. Before a juvenile may be
transferred, the court must find that (1) there is probable
cause to believe that the juvenile has committed the alleged
2
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(5) Family environment: State v. Houston, 70 Ohio
App.3d 152, 156, 570 N.E.2d 839 (1990) ("Appellant's
home situation was less than ideal, and little assistance
could be expected from his family."); State v. Ruple, No.
15726 (9th Dist. Ct. App., 8-4-93) at 5 ("While Ruple's family
environment was good, he had associated himself with
friends with whom he had engaged in criminal behavior.");
State v. Hawkins, No. 3462 (9th Dist. Ct. App., 6-883)(unstable family situation).
(6) School record: State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93,
94, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989) ("[A)verage student who had
not caused' major discipline problems."); State v. Houston,
70 Ohio App.3d 152, 156, 590 N.E.2d 839 (1990)
("Appellant's school attendance was abysmal and his
grades were poor."); State v. Hawkins, No. 3462 (9th Dist.
Ct. App., 6-8-83)(suspended from school 8 times).
(7) Specific facts of the offense that are relevant to physical and mental condition. This factor was added in 1994 in
response to the Watson case, which is discussed below.

nile so long as the totality of the evidence supports a finding
that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment." /d. at 95.
The Court added:
Rule 30 calls for a broad assessment of individual circumstances. Mechanical application of a rigidly defined
test would not serve the purposes of the public or the
juvenile. Further, reduction of the bindover decision to
a formula would constrain desirable judicial discretion.
We agree with appellant that Rule 30(E) [now (F)]
requires consideration of all the listed factors, but we
discern nothing in the rule, or in the policy it serves,
which prohibits consideration of other relevant factors.
/d. at 95-96.
The Court went on to rule that the "seriousness of the
alleged offense" is a valid factor in determining a juvenile's
amenability to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. Again, the court noted that "the juvenile court enjoys
wide latitude to retain or relinquish jurisdiction, and the ultimate decision lies within its sound discretion." /d. 95.

Supreme Court Cases

1994 Amendment
A 1994 amendment to Rule 30 added a sixth factor to
reflect the Court's decision in Watson. Rule 30(F)(6) provides that "the specific facts relating to the offense for which
probable cause was found, to the extent relevant to the
child's physical or mental condition" is a proper consideration. The Staff Note (1994) includes the following caution:
"While there is a danger that taking note of the facts surrounding a particularly heinous crime could prejudice a
court's deliberations on the rehabilitation question, the
Supreme Court of Ohio approved a court's ability to consider the totality of the circumstances which have brought the
juvenile before the court in State v. Watson ...."

The Ohio Supreme Court has discussed the bindover
issue several times.
State v. Carmichael (1973)
In State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568
(1973) (syllabus 1), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (197 4), the
Court recognized that the juvenile court "should have considerable latitude within which to determine whether it
should retain jurisdiction." /d. (syllabus). Moreover, the
statutorily-required investigation "is not required to show
~. that the child cannot be rehabilitated as a juvenile but only
· that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he cannot
be rehabilitated." /d. at 6.
State v. Douglas (1985)
In State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 485 N.E.2d 711 ,
713 (1985), the Court ruled:
Neither R.C. 2151.25 nor Juv. R. 30 requires the juvenile court to make written findings as to the five factors
listed in Juv. R. 30(E) [current (F) which lists 6 factors].
The rule simply requires the court to consider these factors in making its determination on the amenability
issue. Although the better practice would be to address
each factor, as long as sufficient, credible evidence pertaining to each factor exists in the record before the
court, the bind-over order should not be reversed in the
absence of an abuse of discretion. /d. at 36.
The Court also noted that "there is no requirement that
each of the five factors be resolved against the juvenile." /d.
at 37 (citing State v. Oviedo, 5 Ohio App.3d 168, 171, 450
N.E.2d 700 (1982)).

Safety of the Community
In evaluating the "safety of the community," the court may
consider the nature of the offense, the existence of aggravating circumstances, and the extent of any apparent pattern of anti-social conduct. See State v. Carter, 27 Ohio
St.2d 135, 136, 272 N.E.2d 119, 120 (1971) Uuvenile court cited
aggravated character of offense - armed robbery - in the
transfer order).
In State v. Michael, No. 91-C-39 (7th Dist. Ct. App., 7-2393}, the juvenile was charged with nine counts, including
aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and other crimes.
On appeal, the court upheld the decision to transfer:
The juvenile court obviously relied heavily on the serious and sometimes violent nature of the offenses with
which appellant was charged. Having considered all factors, but having placed greater weight on the factors dealing with the violent nature of the crimes, it cannot be
found that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering that appellant be tried as an adult. /d. at 4.
R.C. 2151.26(8) requires the court to consider, as an
aggravating factor, whether the victim of the alleged offense
was 65 years of age or older or was permanently or totally
disabled at the time of the offense. See State v. Hurst, No.
89-C-34 (7th Dist. Ct. App., 8-15-90} at 7 ("We find that the
trial court properly considered the nature of the offense, the
violence involved, and the fact that the victim was eighty-six
years of age.").

State v. Watson (1989)
In State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 547 N.E.2d 1181
(1989}, the defendant appealed the decision to transfer him
to criminal court, where he was tried for aggravated murder
and aggravated robbery. He argued that "amenability to
treatment" must be determined solely by reference to the
factors listed in Rule 30(F} [then Rule 30(E) which listed
only 5 factors]. The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
stating that "[t]here is no requirement that each, or any, of
the five factors in Rule 30(E) be resolved against the juve-
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HEARING AND INVESTIGATION
R.C. 2151.26 and Rule 30 require an investigation and a
hearing as a prerequisite to transfer. In Kent the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "an opportunity for a hearing
which may be informal, must be given the child prior to
entry of a waiver order." 383 U.S. at 561. In explaining the
hearing requirement, the Court wrote: "We do not mean by
this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the
usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and
fair treatment." /d. at 562.

Rule 30 establishes a two-step hearing procedure. First,
a preliminary hearing is held to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe the child has committed a felony.
The child, the prosecutor, or the court may move for a preliminary hearing. If the court finds probable cause, the proceedings are continued until a full investigation is completed,
at which time a second hearing is held to determine whether
jurisdiction should be transferred to the criminal courts.

Waiver
In State ex rei. Doe v. Tracy, 51 Ohio App.3d 198, 555
N.E.2d 674 (1988), the court ordered a mental examination
pursuant to Rule 30. After this examination, the prosecution
moved for a second mental examination by a psychologist
of the state's choosing. The juvenile attempted to waive this
examination but the court refused. When the juvenile, on
advice of counsel, refused to answer questions at the second examination, the court cited him for contempt. The
appellate court upheld the juvenile's right to waive the
examination:
[The statute] makes it equally clear that the decision
to submit to or waive the examination rests ultimately
with the child. The only requirement is that any waiver
must be competently and intelligently made. . . .
Accordingly, where the child competently and intelligently waives the mental and physical examination, the
court must complete its investigation without it. Any
attempt on the part of the court to secure such an
examination over a valid waiver would be unreasonable
and would constitute an abuse of discretion. /d. at 201.

Amenability Hearing

Constitutional Issues

The focus of the second hearing is the amenability of the
child to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. A social
history may be prepared and used for this purpose. Juv. R.
32(A)(2).
It is unclear whether a juvenile can waive the transfer
investigation and hearing. In State v. Newton, No. F-82-17
(6th Dist. Ct. App., 6-10-83), the court held that the investigation and hearing cannot be waived. Once probable
cause is found at the preliminary hearing,
a full investigation is required and a hearing must be
held on the matter to determine whether the court
should transfer jurisdiction to the trial court. At least one
purpose of this hearing is to create a record in which the
factual basis of the transfer order might be shown.
Therefore, we conclude that the Juvenile Court erred in
accepting a "waiver" of these procdures, which are
mandatory and cannot be waived. /d. at 6-7.
In contrast, the court in State v. Soke, No. 62908 (8th
Dist. Ct. App., 7-15-93), upheld such a waiver. The court
wrote:
Defendant also maintains that there is no authority
contained within R.C. Chapter 2151, or Juv. R. 30 which
permits a defendant to waive bind over proceedings.
We agree that there is no specific authority for waiver of
a bind over hearing, but we note that there is likewise no
prohibition for waiver of the hearing.
Defendant also maintains that pursuant to the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in
Kent v.. United States (1966), ... a hearing on the issue
of the bind over is a critical phase and is mandatory.
Critical phases, however, may be knowingly, competently and intelligently waived. /d. at 6-7.

In State ex rei. a Juvenile v. Hoose, 43 Ohio App.3d 109,
539 N.E.2d 704 (1988), the juvenile asserted his Fifth
Amendment right with respect to a court ordered mental
examination by the court psychiatrist. The court rejected
this argument.
In essence, the argument raised by counsel for petitioner is that he faces a dilemma in advising his client
on whether to submit to a mental examination by a
court psychologist because of the potential use of any
incriminating statements made by him during such
examination.
Contrary to petitioner's concern here, it is our view
that any incriminating matter which might be obtained
during the mental examination with the court psychologist pertaining to the relinquishment proceeding is
expressly precluded from being used for anything other
than the waiver determination itself. Juv. R. 32(8).
Consequently, if the juvenile court decides to retain
its jurisdiction, the relevant juvenile rule prevents the
use of any statements made by petitioner during the
course of the ensuing hearing there in determining the
status of the charge or charges there. This provision in
our judgment also bars the use of such statements if
the juvenile is treated as an adult offender in the general division of the common pleas court. /d. at 112.
Citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the juvenile
also moved for a private evaluation at the state's expense.
In Ake the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a criminal defendant had a due process right to a defense expert under
some circumstances. The court of appeals ruled that Ake
did not apply to transfer hearings because these hearings
do not determine guilt or innocence, nor is liberty at stake.
Hoose, 43 Ohio App.3d at 111 (citing State v. R.G.D., 527
A.2d 834, 842 (N.J. 1987).

Probable Cause Hearing

MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
Juvenile Rule 30(8) provides for a mental and physical
examination. This examination may be waived, and refusal
to submit to the examination constitutes a waiver. Juv. R.
30(G); R.C. 2151.26(C) (waiver must be "competently and
intelligently made").

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
R.C. 2151.352 and Juvenile Rule 4(A) recognize the right
to counsel at all juvenile court hearings. The right to counsel at transfer hearings is also constitutionally required. In
4
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on the indictment against him." /d. at 72.
In State v. Parks, 51 Ohio App.3d 194, 555 N.E.2d 671
(1 988), the court distinguished Taylor. At the probable
cause hearing a detective testified that the defendant's
grandmother had told him that she was the legal custodian
and guardian. Although the detective never asked for documentation, the court ruled that the "record thus supports
that notice was properly made upon the defendant's legal
custodian as required by law." /d. at 196.

Kent the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "counsel must be
afforded to the child in waiver proceedings," 383 U.S. at
562-63, and that "there is no place in our system of law for
' reaching a result of such tremendous consequences ...
(~};without effective assistance of counsel .... " /d. at 5~4. See
''!"''also Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 175 {4th C1r. 1970);
lnge v. Slayton, 395 F. Supp. 560, 566 {E.D. Va. 1975),
appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d 277 {4th Cir.l976); James v.
Cox, 323 F. Supp 15, 20 {E.D. Va.l971).
Waiver
Usually, the right to counsel may be waived. In Ohio,
however, the right to counsel at a transfer hearing may not
be waived. Juvenile Rule 3 provides that a child's "right to
be represented by counsel at a hearing conducted pursuant
to Juv. R. 30 may not be waived."

EXCLUSION OF PUBLIC
Juvenile Rule 27(A) and R.C. 2151.35 provide for the
exclusion of the general public from juvenile court hearings;
only persons with a direct interest in the case must be permitted to attend. However, in State ex rei. Fyffe v. Pierce,
40 Ohio St.3d 8, 531 N.E.2d 673 (1988), the Supreme
Court refused to issue a writ of prohibition to close a transfer hearing. The Court pointed out that both the rule and
the statute make closure discretionary. Moreover, the Court
found an adequate remedy at law: "If tried as adults, they
can move for change of venue to alleviate any unfairness
that pretrial publicity may cause. If change of venue is
denied, and relators are subsequently convicted, they can
appeal." /d. at 9.
In In re T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 556 N.E.2d 439 (1 990),
cert. denied sub nom. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Solve, 498
U.S. 958 (1 990), the Supreme Court again addressed the
closure issue, albeit in a dependency case. Due to the
need for confidentiality in dependency cases, the Court
concluded that "there is no qualified right of public access to
juvenile court proceedings to determine if a child is abused,
neglected, or dependent, or to determine custody of a minor
child." /d. at 17. These proceedings are neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed to the press and public.
A trial court may close such a proceeding if, after hearing
evidence and argument on the issue, it finds that: (1) there
exists a reasonable and substantial basis for believing that
public access could harm the child or endanger the fairness
of the proceedings, and (2) the potential for harm outweighs
the benefits of public access. !d.
One juvenile court has concluded that "the holding of
T.R., which provides that certain juvenile court proceedings
are neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed,
should be applied to both the preliminary and amenability
hearings in Juv. R. 30 proceedings." In re D.R., 63 Ohio
Misc.2d 273, 279, 626 N.E.2d 1120 (C.P. 1993).
Another court ruled that "[p]ublic access ought to remain
open to those portions of the bindover proceedings which
directly relate to the nature of the crime alleged to have been
committed. Therefore, the public will have access to the
probable cause hearing." In re N.H., 63 Ohio Misc.2d 285,
297, 626 N.E.2d 697 (C.P. 1992). The amenability phase
was treated differently. "Certain portions of any amenability
hearing ought to be closed, because some portions of such
hearings often involve information about a child's psychological, social and family histories .... " /d. at 298.

Effective Assistance
The right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. This is the rule regarding the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 {1984) (Sixth Amendment requires reasonably
effective assistance of counsel). The U.S. Supreme Court's
references to "effective assistance" of counsel in Kent indicates that the same rule applies to the due process right of
counsel in transfer proceedings. See Geboy v. Gray, 471
F.2d 575 {7th Cir. 1973){noting counsel showed a "notable
lack of zeal" in attempting to find alternatives to transfer).
The function of counsel at a transfer hearing is to challenge the evidence offered by the prosecution and to
~· adduce evidence that the child is amenable to treatment i~
~~ the juvenile system. In Kent, the Court commented that "If
the staff's submissions include materials which are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of
counsel to 'denigrate' such matter." 383 U.S. at 563.
Another court has noted: "The child's advocate should
search for a plan, or perhaps a range of plans, which may
persuade the court that the welfare of the child and the
safety of the community can be served without waiver."
Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1279 {D.C. Cir. 1968).
For a discussion of counsel's role at the transfer hearing,
see IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Counsel for Private
Parties 161-68 (1980); Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform
and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative /dea/,"65 Minn. L. Rev.l67, 224-30 {1980).
NOTICE
R.C. 2151.26(D) and Juvenile Rule 30(C) require that written notice of the time, place, and nature of the hearing be
given to the parents or guardian and counsel at least three
days prior to the hearing.
In State v. Taylor, 26 Ohio App.3d 69, 498 N.E.2d 211
(1985), the court ruled that the "notice of hearing requirements ... are mandatory requirements, which cannot be
waived by the juvenile by failing to object to non-compliance." /d. at 71. The presence of the defendant's sister at
the hearing did not satisfy this requirement because she
1
, > was not the legal custodian. The court also held that the
notice requirement was jurisdictional: 'Tnhe juvenile court,
failing to comply with the notice of hearing provisions of
R.C. 2151.26, was without jurisdiction to bind the defendant
over to the criminal, or general, division of the common
pleas court and the latter was without jurisdiction to proceed

EVIDENCE
In many jurisdictions the rules of evidence are relaxed in
transfer hearings because these hearings are considered
dispositional in nature. See S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles 417 (2d ed 1980).
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Ohio Rules of Evidence
At least as a general rule, however, in Ohio the rules of
evidence apply in transfer hearings. Evidence Rule 101
provides that the Rules of Evidence "govern proceedings in
the courts of this state and before court-appointed referees
of this state .... "
There is, however, an important exception: Evidence
Rule IOI(C)(6) exempts from the Rules of Evidence proceedings in which other rules prescribed by the Ohio Supreme
Court govern evidentiary matters. Thus, where the Rules of
Evidence are in conflict with any other procedural rule, the
"other rule" prevails. For example, Juvenile Rule 32(A)(2)
expressly permits the use of a social history in transfer proceedings, although much of the material contained in a
social history would be inadmissible under the Rules of
Evidence. Juvenile Rule 2(ii) defines the social history as
"the personal and family history of a child or any other party
to a juvenile proceeding and may include the prior record of
the person with the juvenile court or any other court."
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, the Ohio
Supreme Court had upheld the use of a social history at a
transfer hearing, despite its hearsay character. State v.
Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S.II61 (1974). See also State v. Riggins, 68
Ohio App.2d 1, 7, 426 N.E.2d 504, 509 (1980) ("The Ohio
Supreme Court has held that hearsay evidence is admissible at a relinquishment proceeding in Juvenile Court in the
form of psychiatric reports from the Ohio Youth Commission
Juvenile Diagnostic Center.").
In Carmichael, however, the Court also indicated that the
psychiatrists and psychologists whose opinions appeared in
the social history could have been called as witnesses:
'TDhey were never called, nor was any effort made to call
them by defense counsel, even though counsel had access
to those documents for more than two months prior to the
hearing." 35 Ohio St.2d at 3-4.

opinions in making its determination whether the defendant
is amenable to rehabilitation." State v. Houston,! 70 Ohio
App.3d 152, 156, 590 N.E.2d 839 (1990) (citing State v.
Dickens, No. 12967 (9th Dist. Ct. App., 9-23-87).
t;;,;t

!)

Right of Confrontation
The issue of whether the right of confrontation applies at
a transfer hearing was raised in State v. Riggins, 68 Ohio
App.2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 504 (1980). In that case, the defendant contended that he was denied due process because
he was deprived of the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him, i.e., the confession of a codefendant was
read into evidence by a police officer. The court overruled
this objection because the defendant failed to provide a
transcript to support his allegations. /d. at 7-8. See also
People ex rei. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 352 N.Y.S.2d 561, affd,
360 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div.l974) (due process requires probable cause determination be based on nonhearsay evidence}.
Experts
Expert testimony concerning the juvenile's psychological
condition and potential for treatment is admissible. E.g.,
State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 94, 547 N.E.2d 1181
(1989) ("At the hearing, the court clinic psychiatrist ... testified that appellant showed 'no evidence of any psychiatric
disorder."'); State v. Parks, 51 Ohio App.3d 194, 197, 555
N.E.2d 671 (1988) ("The social worker ... testified it would
be doubtful that the appellant would be amenable to rehabilitation in a juvenile institution.").
The juvenile court, however, "is not bound by the experts'
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SELF-INCRIMINATION
'-i
The privilege against self-incrimination applies in transfer
hearings. R.E.M v. State, 532 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975). See also IJA-ABA Standards Relating to
Transfer Between Courts 50 (1980).
In Gault the U.S. Supreme Court held the privilege applicable to adjudicatory hearings. 387 U.S. at 55. In other cases,
the Court has stated that the privilege is applicable in any
proceeding "civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate [a person] in future criminal proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
By testifying at a transfer hearing, the child waives the
privilege against self-incrimination. Whether the child's
statement may later be used at a criminal trial or at an
adjudicatory hearing is unclear. If his statements may be
used against him at a later time, the child is placed in an
untenable position. The juvenile must either give up the
privilege or the right to be heard at the transfer hearing.
The U.S. Supreme Court considered an analogous situation
in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), which
involved a similar choice facing criminal defendants in suppression hearings:
Thus, in this case [the defendant] was obliged either
to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to
be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect,
to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self@
incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. We therefore hold
that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to
suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his
testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at
trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.
/d. at 394.
Several courts in other jurisdictions have applied this reasoning to transfer hearings: "[C]andid testimony by the
juvenile at the fitness hearing should be encouraged to aid
in the determination of where best to try the minor; fairness
to the minor requires that this testimony not be given at the
expense of the privilege against self-incrimination." Sheila
0. v. Superior Court, 178 Cal Rptr 418, 420 (Cal. App.l981).
Accordingly, statements made at transfer hearings have
been held inadmissible at subsequent criminal trials and
adjudicatory hearings. Bryan v. Superior Court, 498 P.2d
1079, 1087 (Cal.l972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Ransom, 288 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. 1972);
Sheila 0. v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. Rptr. 418, 420 (Cal. App.
1981) (except for impeachment). See also IJA-ABA
Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts 50-51 (1980).
In State ex rei. a Juvenile v. Hoose, 43 Ohio App.3d 109,
539 N.E.2d 704 (1988), the court of appeals addressed a
similar issue in the context of the mental examination:
In essence, the argument raised by counsel for petitioner is that he faces a dilemma in advising his client
on whether to submit to a mental examination by a
court psychologist because of the potential use of any
incriminating statements made by him during such
examination.
Contrary to petitioner's concern here, it is our view

Mere recitation of the conclusory language set forth
in Juv. R. 30(C)(I) and (2) is not sufficient. Conclusions
are not reasons, as contemplated by Juv. R. 30(G). The
"reasonable grounds" for the court's belief that a juvenile is not amenable to rehabilitation and that the community's safety may require his legal restraint must be
spelled out with reasonable specificity. Stated differently, Juv. R. 30(G) necessitates findings of fact from which
to determine the prerequisites in Juv. R. 30(C)(I) and (2)
and upon which to base the transfer order. /d. at 7.
However, in State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 485
N.E.2d 711,713 (1985), the Court ruled:
Neither R.C. 2151.25 nor Juv. R. 30 requires the juvenile court to make written findings as to the five factors
listed in Juv. R. 30(E) [current (F) which lists 6 factors].
The rule simply requires the court to consider these factors in making its determination on the amenability
issue. Although the better practice would be to address
each factor, as long as sufficient credible evidence pertaining to each factor exists in the record before the
court, the bind-over order should not be reversed in the
absence of an abuse of discretion. /d. at 36 (emphasis
added).
Courts in other jurisdictions have insisted upon specific
reasons for transfer. See Summers v. State, 230 N.E.2d
320, 325 (lnd.l967); Risner v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d
775 (Ky.l974); In re Heising, 565 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Ore. App.
1977); Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767, 770 (R.I.I967). See
a/so IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Transfer Between
Courts 33-34 (1980).

that any incriminating matter which might be obtained
during the mental examination with the court psychologist pertaining to the relinquishment proceeding is expressly precluded from being used for anything other
than the waiver determination itself. Juv. R. 32(B).
Consequently, if the juvenile court decides to retain
jurisdiction, the relevant juvenile rule prevents the use of
any statements made by petitioner during the course of
the ensuing hearing there in determining the status of
the charge or Charges there. This provision in our judgment also bars the use of such statements if the juvenile
is treated as an adult offender in the general division of
the common pleas court. /d. at 112.
It is unclear whether this rationale also -applies to the
juvenile's statements at the hearing.
'

ACCESS TO REPORTS
Juvenile Rule 32(C) provides for the right to inspect a
social history or report of a mental or physical examination
a reasonable time prior to the transfer hearing. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Kent held that counsel had a right of
access to social service records. The Court left no doubt
that the right of inspection was intended to permit counsel
to challenge the accuracy of these reports:
[l]f the staff's submissions include materials which
are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel to "denigrate" such matter.
There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy
attached to staff reports. If a decision on waiver is "critically important" it is equally of "critical importance" that
the material submitted to the judge ... be subjected ..
.,
. to examination, criticism and refutation. While the
(
Juvenile Court judge may, of course, receive ex parte
analyses and recommendations from his staff, he may
not, for purposes of a decision on waiver, receive and
rely upon secret information, whether emanating from
his staff or otherwise. 383 U.S. at 563.

RIGHT TO A TRANSCRIPT
Juvenile Rule 37(A) provides for the right to a complete
record of all juvenile court hearings upon request.
Moreover, one Ohio court, citing due process and equal
protection grounds, has held that an indigent juvenile has a
right to a transcript in transfer proceedings. State v. Ross,
23 Ohio App.2d 215, 216-17, 262 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1970).
The importance of a transcript is illustrated by State v.
Riggins, 68 Ohio App.2d I, 426 N.E.2d 504 (1980), in which
the appellate court overruled an alleged error at a transfer
hearing because the "appellant has failed to provide this
court with a transcript of the hearing before the Juvenile
Court at which this evidence was presented." /d. at 7-8.
See a/so F. Bailey & H. Rothblatt, Handling Juvenile
Delinquency Cases 183 (1982) ("insist that the proceedings
be transcribed").

(c

STATEMENT OF REASONS
RC 2151.26(F) and Juvenile Rule 30(H) require the court
to state reasons if it decides to transfer the child. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Kent also required a statement of the
reasons:
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court
should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons
motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement
of the relevant facts. It may not "assume" that there are
adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume that "full
investigation" has been made. Accordingly, we hold
that it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or
considerations therefor. We do not read the statute as
requiring that this statement must be formal or that it
should necessarily include conventional findings of fact.
But the statement should be sufficient to demonstrate
that the statutory requirement of "full investigation" has
been met; and that the question has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set
forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to
permit meaningful review. 383 U.S. at 561.
In State v. Newton, No. F-82-17 (6th Dist. Ct. App., 6-1083), the court held:

POS~TRANSFERISSUES

Retention of Jurisdiction
If the juvenile court decides to retain jurisdiction, it must
schedule a hearing on the merits. Juv R 30(0). One court
has stated that a juvenile judge is not disqualified from presiding at an adjudicatory hearing because of his involvement in a prior transfer hearing. In re Terry H, I O.B.R. 377,
378 (C.P. 1982).
In contrast, the IJA-ABA Standards recognize a child's
right to disqualify the transfer hearing judge from participating in subsequent proceedings: "No matter how fair the
waiver judge may be in subsequent proceedings, an
impression of unfairness will exist." IJA-ABA Standards
Relating to Transfer-Between Courts 52 (1980). See a/so
Donald L. v. Superior Court, 498 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Cal. 1972)
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Criticism

("[l]f the referee or judge who hears the issue of fitness
decides that the minor should be retained in the juvenile
court, he may not thereafter properly preside at a contested hearing on the issue of jurisdiction.").

There is, however, a serious disadvantage to this rule.
The time consumed during the prosecution of the case in
criminal court and during the appellate process may place
the defendant beyond the age jurisdiction of the juvenile
court. In this event, an appellate court that finds error in a
transfer proceeding must either free the improperly transferred individual, because neither juvenile nor criminal court
has jurisdiction, or reconstruct the transfer process to determine whether a hearing free from error would have resulted
in transfer. The difficulty with this procedure is that the
reconstructed hearing must "attempt to imagine" the child as
he was at the time of the original transfer hearing. IJA-ABA
Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts 53 (1980).

Transfer of Jurisdiction
If the juvenile court decides to transfer jurisdiction, it will
set the terms and conditions for release of the child in
accordance with Criminal Rule 46. If the juvenile is in
detention he may be transferred to the appropriate officer or
detention facility in accordance with the law governing the
detention of adults. RC 2151.312(A).
The criminal court to which jurisdiction has been transferred may not "review the factual findings of the juvenile
court on the issue of amenability." State v. Whiteside, 6
Ohio App.3d 30,36-37, 452 N.E.2d 332, 339 (1982).
Once a child is transferred, a grand jury may indict for any
offense appropriate under the facts; the grand jury is not
limited to the charges filed in juvenile court. State v.
Adams, 69 Ohio St.2d 120, 124-25, 431 N.E.2d 326 (1982) (a
grand jury does not exceed its authority by returning indictments on charges which were not originally filed in juvenile
court); State v. Klingenberger, 113 Ohio St. 418, 425, 149 N.E.
395, 397 (1925).
Moreover, a criminal defendant's statutory right to a
speedy trial does not commence until the juvenile court
relinquishes jurisdiction. State v. Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St. 3d
62, 67, 461 N.E.2d 892 (1984); State ex rei. Williams v.
Court of Common Pleas, 42 Ohio St.2d 433, 434, 329
N.E.2d 680, 681 (1975).

DOUBLE JEOPARD
The United States Supreme Court has applied double
jeopardy principles to bindover proceedings. In Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed
a California procedure that permitted transfer after a child
had been found delinquent in an adjudicatory hearing. The
Court held that this procedure violated the double jeopardy
clause: "We believe it is simply too late in the day to conclude ... that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has committed
acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years." /d. at
529.
In a footnote, however, the Court distinguished the
California procedure from a transfer procedure requiring
only a finding of probable cause: "We note that nothing
decided today forecloses States from requiring, as a prerequisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial evidence
that he committed the offense charged, so long as the
showing required is not made in an adjudicatory proceeding .... The instant case is not one in which the judicial
determination was simply a finding of, e.g., probable cause.
Rather, it was an adjudication that respondent had violated
a criminal statute." /d. at 538 n.l8.
In Sims v. Engle, 619 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 936 (1981), the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio
transfer procedure, as it then existed, suffered from the
same deficiencies that marked the California procedure in
Breed. According to the court, this procedure violated the
double jeopardy guarantee.
The Ohio statute was amended after Sims. Unlike the
former procedure, the present transfer procedure requires
only a finding of probable cause and not a determination of
delinquency. The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of this procedure: "We reject the contention that the
introduction of evidence of probable cause to believe
appellant committed the alleged offense without more,
transformed the hearing into an adjudicatory proceeding."
Keener v. Taylor, 640 F..2d 839, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1981).

APPEALS
In Ohio a juvenile court order transferring jurisdiction to
the criminal courts is not a final appealable .order. In re
Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974). Accord
State ex rei. Torres v. Simmons, 68 Ohio St.2d 118, 428
N.E.2d 862 (1981 ). Thus, a transfer order may be challenged on appeal only after trial and conviction in the criminal courts. Similarly, a writ of prohibition may not be used
to challenge a transfer order. State ex rei. Torres v.
Simmons, 68 Ohio St.2d 118, 428 N.E.2d 862 (1981).
Although a number of jurisdictions permit appeals of transfer orders, the Ohio rule appears to be the majority rule.
See IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Transfer Between
Courts 53 (1980).
The Ohio Supreme Court has provided the following reasons for its position:
To permit interlocutory review of such an order would
obviously delay the prosecution of any proceeding in
either the juvenile or the criminal division, with the
result that the prospect of a just disposition would be
jeopardized. In either proceeding the primary issue is
the ascertainment of innocence or guilt of the person
charged. To permit interlocutory review would subordinate that primary issue and defer its consideration
while the question of the punishment appropriate for a
suspect whose guilt has not yet been ascertained is
being litigated in reviewing courts. We are unwilling to
sanction such a procedure. In re Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d
84, 86, 314 N.E.2d 158, 159 (1974).
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